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BOOK REVIEW
A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice
Litigation, and Patient Compensation, By Paul C. Wei-
ler, Howard H. Hiatt, Josephine P. Newhouse, William G.
Johnson, Troyen A. Brennan & Lucian L. Leape. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press. 1993. Pp. 175. Hardcover.
$29.95.
Reviewed by Melvyn D. Silver*
Does medical malpractice tort litigation actually result in
improved medical care? If so, is the burden of the cost of that
type of litigation upon our medical and legal system worth it?
And, whether the answer is yes or no, is there possibly a bet-
ter way to provide compensation for those suffering medical
injury? These are the questions that led to the commission of
the Harvard Medical Practice Study in 1988. The study team
included Paul C. Weiler, Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School; Howard H. Hiatt, Professor of Medicine at Harvard
Medical School; Joseph P. Newhouse, Professor of Health Pol-
icy and Management at Harvard Medical School and Ken-
nedy School of Government; William G. Johnson, Professor of
Health Economics at Arizona State University; Troyen A.
Brennan, Professor of Law and Public Health at Harvard
School of Public Health; and Lucian L. Leape, Abject Profes-
sor at Harvard School of Public Health. Together, the team of
doctors, lawyers, economists, and statisticians set out to in-
vestigate what was actually happening to patients in hospi-
tals and to doctors in courtrooms. The story behind the
study, and the impressive results it acheived, are chronicled
* Melvyn D. Silver is a sole practitioner practicing tort law since 1973 in
Santa Clara County. He is presently President of the Santa Clara County Trial
Lawyers Association and a Trustee of the Santa Clara County Bar Association.
He received his undergraduate degrees in engineering from New York Univer-
sity in 1959 and 1962, and his J.D. from Georgetown University School of Law
in 1970. He was admitted to the California Bar in 1971.
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in A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice Lit-
igation, and Patient Compensation.1
A Measure of Malpractice is divided into three separate
sections and seven chapters. The first section discusses the
malpractice setting and the policy debate about medical mal-
practice.2 The second section examines the epidemiology of
medical injury, and patient injury and malpractice litiga-
tion.3 The third section examines patient losses and compen-
sation, and medical malpractice litigation and injury preven-
tion.4 Finally, the authors discuss their own feelings in a
section aptly called "Ruminations for the Future."5
The idea for the study was conceived in 1984 by then-
Deans Howard Hiatt of the Harvard School of Public Health
and James Vorenberg of the Harvard Law School, both of
whom were concerned over the mounting personal and eco-
nomic costs of the medical malpractice system.6 As member-
ship in the group grew, so did the awareness that a serious
study in the area of medical malpractice was needed. The
group recognized that the controversies surrounding medical
malpractice tort reform legislation before the legislatures of
New York and Massachusetts in 1988 "rested almost entirely
on anecdotal evidence too easily tailored to the predisposition
of the protagonist."7 The authors further recognized that,
with the exception of a study on the incidence of medical in-
jury in California in the mid-1970's, no detailed study existed
concerning the incidence of medical injury that would permit
legislatures to make informed decisions on this serious is-
sue." The issue was serious not only because of the costs to
the public resulting from the administration of a tort system
involving medical injury, but also because of the cost of medi-
cal malpractice insurance to doctors-a cost that was, by ne-
cessity, being passed on to the consuming public by the prac-
ticing physician.9
1. PAUL C. WEILER, ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).
2. Id. at 1-32.
3. Id. at 33-76.
4. Id. at 77-134.
5. Id. at 135-152.
6. Id. at vii.
7. Id. at viii.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 2.
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In preparation for the study, the group sought support
from its home state of Massachusetts.10 Massachusetts, how-
ever, denied the team the funding it needed.'1 The legislature
had proposals before it at the time the study was being
formed, and this legislature was not interested in a study
that might produce a factual basis for serious litigation but
simultaneously derail proposals currently before it. 2 As the
democratic process plodded forward in Massachussetts, how-
ever, the State of New York stepped forward and provided the
necessary support.13 Through the support of the New York
governor and Dr. David Axelrod, Commissioner of Health of
New York, a four-million-dollar amendment was attached to
New York's pending malpractice reform bill to allow the
study to go forward.1 4 Dr. Axelrod recognized the signifi-
cance the study could have for the state of New York. In
1988, he estimated that New York doctors and hospitals were
spending approximately one billion dollars annually for mal-
practice insurance. 5
Section one describes the primary steps the group took
prior to engaging in its empirical study of New York's medical
malpractice system.' 6 As a foundation for the study, and as a
manner of framing the problem that New York faced, the
team examined New York's system in terms of malpractice
insurance, claims frequency, and length of time from injury
to payment. The authors note that in New York, the average
doctor paid $360.00 (in 1990 dollars) for liability coverage in
1949; $1,000.00 in 1965; $7,300.00 by 1975; and by the end of
the 1980's, almost $40,000.00 per year.' 7 Some doctors in
high-risk fields such as obstetrics paid almost $200,000.00
per year.' 8 The authors state that these malpractice premi-
ums are not unusual, but are similar to those charged in
states such as Florida, Michigan, and Illinois. 9 These premi-
ums were highlighted in the initial "malpractice crisis" that
10. Id. at viii.
11. Id.
12. Id. at viii-ix.
13. Id. at ix.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1-32.
17. Id. at viii.
18. Id.
19. Id.
1994]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
occurred in the mid-1970's, followed by a second crisis in the
mid-1980's.20 During each of these periods, insurance rates
rose dramatically.2 1 The authors anticipate that the trend
will continue in the 1990's.2"
During this same time period, the authors note that
claims frequency, as measured by the number of claims per
doctor per year, also rose from just over one claim per one
hundred doctors per year in the late 1950's to well over ten
claims per one hundred doctors in the mid-1980's.2 3 The av-
erage payment made on successful claims rose from
$40,000.00 (in 1990 dollars) in 1970 to nearly $150,000.00 by
the end of the 1980's.24 Individual malpractice awards that
captured the attention of the public (as well as that of the
insurers and legislatures) included a $52,000,000.00 mal-
practice verdict in Houston in 1988, a $54,000,000.00 verdict
in Los Angeles in 1989, a $78,000,000.00 award in Chicago in
1990, and a stunning $127,000,000.00 award against an Illi-
nois ophthalmologist in 1991.25 While the authors point out
that these are inordinately high awards, they indicate that
these awards form much of the basis of the anecdotal evi-
dence used by legislators, doctors, and insurers in pressing
the case for malpractice tort reform litigation.26
The authors indicate that malpractice litigation is not as
rewarding as it may seem. The median time from injury to
claim is thirteen months, and from claim to payment is
twenty-three months, a total of three years.2 The study
found that claims for the most serious injuries, generating
the greatest financial hardships for the patient, averaged six
years to conclusion in New York-and at times, more than a
decade.28 Even after such lengthy time periods, only about
half of the patients who filed claims ultimately received any
payment at all.29 Most tragic, as the authors point out, is the
fact of life known to all attorneys practicing in the field of
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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medical malpractice: "partly because of the delay factor just
mentioned, the most severely injured victims-those with the
greatest needs for immediate relief-settled their claims for
the smallest proportion of their actual losses."
3 0
Thus, as the authors prepared to enter the detailed
phase of their study, they noted that approximately seven bil-
lion dollars a year in premiums and self-insurance were part
of the medical malpractice system.3 1 This figure was separate
and apart from the economic and psychological burdens
placed on providers and payors in the health care system, and
still separate from the injuries suffered by those affected by
medical malpractice.2
The scope of the study was the broadest yet undertaken
on the subject. The team sifted through 30,000 hospital
records, tracked down and interviewed 2,500 patients, sur-
veyed 1,000 doctors, and examined nearly 70,000 malpractice
claims filed in New York between 1975 and 1989. 33 Needless
to say, hospitals and physicians participating in the study did
not want evidence of malpractice that might be uncovered to
be revealed to patients.3 4 The team therefore chose 1984 as
the study year, a time when New York's thirty-month statute
of limitations would have run3 5 In terms of patients, the sub-
jects interviewed included both medically injured patients
and a match control group who had not been injured during
treatment.3 The patients were not informed that the study
involved tort reform or medical malpractice.3 Instead, the
subjects were told the study concerned "the economic conse-
quences of hospitalization."38 As a further control, the inter-
viewers themselves were unaware that any of the patient
subjects might have been injured at all, or that the subject of
the study was related to the issue of malpractice. 9
In its empirical investigation, the Harvard team ex-
amined what New York's medical and legal systems were ac-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 10.
34. Id. at xi-xv.
35. Id. at xi.
36. Id. at xii.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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tually doing with respect to medical injuries, rather than
what they should be doing.40 In a discussion of the tort sys-
tem, the authors noted the significant change that had oc-
curred in who pays. Where the tort system was originally
designed to punish the negligent actor, from which the negli-
gent actor would learn to improve his actions, such "punish-
ment" is now paid by a liability insurer.4 1 Given that insurers
pay the liability claim, and the doctor personally does not, is
there a justification for the tort system improving medical
care? In effect, has the occurrence of liability insurance
changed the entire rational basis for a tort malpractice
system?
The authors note that in a great number of cases, if not
all cases, the patient's subsequent medical bills are also paid
by insurance-whether through Medi-Cal, Medicaid, a differ-
ent state program, or a private insurer.4 2 While the patient
suffers the result of the injury, the personal economic loss
from medical bills is substantially lessened. Through social
security disability payments, state disability payments, long-
term disability insurance, and other possible income replace-
ment programs, much of the income loss to the disabled
worker has also been compensated. These developments
raise the question of whether the functions and initial pur-
poses of the tort malpractice litigation system have been out-
dated. All of this information must be considered in light of
the fact that when a successful malpractice award is received,
only about forty percent of the total amount expended in the
claims process actually reaches the injured patient. 43 That
total amount includes legal defense costs, as well as the
plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs. 44
In its consideration of the possible weaknesses of New
York's system, the team discussed the alternative system of
no-fault compensation, such as is practiced in New Zealand
and Sweden.45 Under a no-fault scheme, all iatrogenic inju-
ries (injuries induced by medical injuries that prolong the pa-
tient's hospital stay), whether or not a result of medical negli-
40. Id. at 13.
41. See id. at 15.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 17.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 19-26.
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gence, would theoretically be eligible for compensation.46 The
authors engage in a detailed statistical study that is most il-
luminating. Included in this discussion is whether such a
system would be affordable and whether it can be adminis-
tered properly. 47 Noting that a no-fault model in worker's
compensation expends roughly twenty percent of the claims
dollar on administration (compared to sixty percent in mal-
practice), the authors also note that the two systems are not
quite comparable.48 In worker's compensation situations, a
worker presumably reports to work healthy and leaves in-
jured.4 9 Causation usually is a factor. On the other hand, a
patient generally enters a hospital already ill, and becomes
"iller."50 Determining whether the additional increment in
illness or injury was caused by the hospital or was simply a
logical continuation of the patient's illness is not always
simple. 51
A better analogy might be to attempt to determine, in the
worker's compensation system, whether a disease for which
the injured worker seeks compensation is an "occupational
disease" or one occurring outside the work environment. The
advantage of the no-fault system is that once it is determined
that an iatrogenic injury has occurred, fault need not be ad-
dressed. 52 Fault should be discovered, however, for the pur-
pose of improving the quality of medical care.5 3 Here, physi-
cian judgment is necessary-and if it is the physicians at a
local institution judging each other, can this judgment be re-
lied upon? What is the actual magnitude of the problem?
How much medical treatment actually results in iatrogenic
injury?
The authors note that the prior California study of
20,000 hospital records in 1974 found adverse events oc-
curred in 4.65% (1 in 21) of all hospitalizations, and negligent
adverse events (or potentially litigable events) occurred in
.79% (1 in 125) of hospitalizations.54 The prior study found
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id. at 27-30.
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id. at 23.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 24-25.
54. Id. at 36.
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that one of every six iatrogenic injuries resulted from negli-
gent medical practice.55 What could the result be in New
York? The authors devised a detailed study system for the
review of the approximately 30,000 potential medical claims
that could occur in New York.
Fifty-one different hospitals throughout the State of New
York were selected, with 31,000 records reviewed relative to
the 2.6 million people hospitalized annually in New York.56
Teams of medical research analysts and physicians travelled
to each hospital to review the records. 57 Virtually every rec-
ord requested was ultimately found by the hospital and pro-
vided for review. 58 Indeed, what is remarkable to a practic-
ing litigator such as this reviewer is the fact that for the
purpose of this type of study, the hospitals were able to sup-
ply such complete records. Those involved in litigation will
note the difficulty hospitals always seem to claim in produc-
ing records when involved in actual litigation. What a differ-
ence the purpose of the request for records obviously makes.
Where there were differences between two reviewers on im-
portant issues, the file was reviewed yet again by a senior
physician. 9 In the end, over 96% of all records sought were
obtained in full.60 The results were striking. Of the 30,195
records actually reviewed, 1,278 adverse events occurred as a
result of medical management during the hospitalization.61
Three hundred and six injuries were the result of provider
negligence.2 After eliminating certain adverse events for sta-
tistical purposes, the authors ultimately analyzed 922 inju-
ries that they could "positively identify as resulting from care
provided at one of our hospitals."63 For the risk factor analy-
sis, the authors utilized all 1,278 events.64 The result was
that the incidence of adverse events suffered by hospitalized
patients was 3.7%.65 Of these events, 27.6% were due to
medical negligence; in essence, one percent of all patients
55. Id.
56. Id. at 40.
57. Id. at 41.
58. Id. at 42.
59. Id. at 41.
60. Id. at 42.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 43.
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hospitalized suffered a negligent medical injury.66 These
figures were remarkably similar to those compiled in Califor-
nia a decade earlier. An adverse medical event occurs in
approximately 4% of all hospitalizations, and one-quarter of
these events involves substandard care.68 Getting past sta-
tistics and into real life, the numbers are frightening. The
authors note that among the 2.6 million patients discharged
from New York hospitals in 1984, nearly 99,000 suffered dis-
abling injuries.6 9 Of these, 56,000 produced minimal impair-
ment, from which patients recovered within one month,
70
and 13,500 led to impairment with recovery in less than six
months.7 ' Still, 3,800 patients had serious injuries, where
permanent impairment caused a disability level ranging up
to fifty percent; another 2,500 suffered severe to total disabil-
ity.72 Most frightening of all, 13,400 New York patients died
in 1984 as a result of medical treatment.73 Thirty-four per-
cent of the adverse events that led to permanent total disabil-
ity were due to substandard care, as were fifty-one percent of
the deaths from adverse events. 74 Two-thirds of the injuries
produced by grave negligence were fatal, six times the mor-
tality rate from non-negligent iatrogenic injuries. 71 Project-
ing the statistics across the nation, assuming the New York
model holds true in all other states, more people die from ia-
trogenic injury than from any other cause, including motor
vehicle accidents and cardiac events.76 The authors state:
If New York's adverse-event-related death total can be ex-
trapolated to the U.S. population as a whole, one would
estimate over 150,000 iatrogenic fatalities annually, more
than half of which are due to negligence. Medical injury,
then, accounts for more deaths than all other types of acci-
dents combined, and dwarfs the mortality associated with
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 43-44.
70. Id. at 44.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 45.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 55.
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motor vehicle accidents (50,000 deaths per year) and occu-
pation-related mishaps (6,000 deaths per year).77
Had the authors stopped here, the need for the study would
have been justified. In chapters four78 and five,79 the
Harvard team correlates the results of their study with the
legal system. In particular, the authors ask these pertinent
questions: How many malpractice cases were being brought?
How many of those involved provider negligence? Were legis-
lative mandates (such as shorter and tighter statutes of limi-
tations, procedures for claims screening and certification, and
restriction on the size of contingent fees) valid? Malpractice
litigation was reviewed with evidence provided through the
New York Department of Health and New York's liability in-
surance carriers.8 0 Patricia Danzon's 1974 California study,
which reviewed medical malpractice claims between 1975
and 1978 in California and elsewhere, was reviewed.8 '
Danzon found that for every ten negligent adverse events
(torts) within the California health care system, only one
medical malpractice claim was lodged. 2 Only forty percent of
those claims ever received any payment through the legal
system.83 How did Danzon's study compare ten years later in
New York? The Harvard study found that the frequency of
claims rose from six per one hundred physicians in 1976 to
seven per one hundred physicians in 1984.84 In spite of this
increase, if the Danzon study were true, then there would not
be an excess of malpractice litigation, but rather an actual
"malpractice gap"-too few malpractice claims being filed!8 5
After reviewing the number of claims actually filed against
physicians, and the number of doctors who were actually neg-
ligent, the authors concluded that:
[O]ur investigation of the incidence and distribution of lit-
igation in New York demonstrates that while the legal
system does in fact operate erratically, it hardly operates
excessively. Indeed, precisely because so many claims
77. Id.
78. Id. at 61-76.
79. Id. at 77-110.
80. Id. at 61.
81. Id. at 62-63.
82. Id. at 62.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 69.
85. Id. at 69-73.
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brought by patients are misdirected, earlier comparisons
of the totals of negligent injuries and malpractice claims
actually disguised how small are the odds that a poten-
tially legitimate tort claim will be brought. 8
Although a substantial majority of malpractice claims filed
by patients do not flow from truly negligent injuries, the au-
thors note that the legal system does a surprisingly accurate
job of sifting valid from invalid claims.17 One question, of
course, is how to protect innocent doctors from invalid claims,
and to assure that more valid claims than invalid claims are
filed. 8 The authors note that the chances that any one doctor
will be sued are far greater if negligent treatment has oc-
curred than if it has not. 9 The litigation process often serves
as a discovery process, in the plaintiffs attempt to obtain the
records and files to determine whether a negligent event oc-
curred. By contrast, this study provided to the Harvard re-
viewers all of the information not otherwise easily obtainable
by a plaintiff at the commencement of litigation. These re-
viewers thus had the advantage of hindsight in determining
whether negligence occurred, but the plaintiff at the initia-
tion of litigation has only an estimate of negligence by fore-
sight. In the end, a much greater ratio of injured patients do
not sue than do sue.90 Even after controlling for those pa-
tients injured as a result of medical negligence but whose in-
juries were slight and whose recoveries occurred in a short
period of time, the Harvard team found as follows:
But even after controlling for this factor, we found several
times as many seriously disabled patients who received no
legal redress for their injury as innocent doctors who bore
the burden of defending against unwarranted malpractice
claims. Our data make clear, then, that the focus of legis-
lative concern should be that the malpractice system is
too inaccessible, rather than too accessible, to the victims
of negligent medical treatment.91
If malpractice litigation's goal is to provide compensation
for the injured victim, and to draw the tortfeasor's error to his
attention so that he may learn thereby, how effective is that
86. Id. at 73.
87. Id. at 75.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 76.
91. Id.
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system? If the primary aspect is to provide compensation for
the injured person, is this system effective?
The authors note that the overwhelming number of inju-
ries are short-term. Within six months, sixty-three percent of
persons suffering iatrogenic injuries had returned to work.92
The medical costs and wage losses for these victims generally
came to less than $4,000.00 in each category over that time
period.93 Again, while most iatrogenic injuries were minor,
thirty-seven percent resulted in some sort of major disabil-
ity.9 4 If the purpose of any tort reform system is to bring
compensation to these victims, how will this occur? The team
looked at all sources of income: long-term disability income,
short-term disability income, state disability income, Medi-
care, employer plans, community plans, welfare, charitable
plans, and family help were all considered. 95 The authors
also considered the effect of taxes.96 The authors concluded
that if any no-fault plan goes into effect, there must be a cer-
tain deductible period, such as a six-month waiting period.97
However, the costs incurred in this period are relatively
small-a two-month waiting period as opposed to a six-month
waiting period would impose only $42,000,000 in additional
benefit payments in the New York plan that they propose as
feasible, as against a total expenditure of one-billion-dol-
lars-the same amount currently expended on medical mal-
practice insurance premiums. 98
However, would a no-fault system, even if it were able to
compensate victims, result in injury prevention? And in con-
sidering the billion-dollar payment in a no-fault system that
might be instituted in New York, is that truly a fair figure?
The one-billion-dollar figure comes after patients have al-
ready paid for certain features of treatment on their own
(through their own medical insurance, for example). This
system requires that these other medical insurance costs and
medical treatment costs be borne by the greater segment of
society, outside of the plan. The authors wisely do not at-
tempt to make any evaluation of this factor; it would un-
92. Id. at 92.
93. Id. at 96.
94. See id. at 92.
95. Id. at 77-109.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 101.
98. Id. at 102-03.
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doubtedly entail a detailed study of the entire socioeconomic
system of health care benefits in the United States. The Con-
gress of the United States is embarking on such an undertak-
ing at the present time.
In chapter six, the authors consider "malpractice litiga-
tion and injury prevention." In this regard, the authors inter-
viewed physicians who had been the subject of malpractice
claims, and who had a fear of malpractice claims. 99 They con-
sidered what effect the fear of a malpractice claim had upon
their actual practice. 100 They also considered hospitals in
which a greater number of claims had been brought, particu-
larly whether those hospitals had instituted better medical
control of procedures, and better medical practice in gen-
eral. 10 1 In effect, did the tort system work?
The authors note that malpractice litigation is directed
toward enforcing rather than defining the appropriate stan-
dard of physician care.' It penalizes physicians who deviate
from the standard of care. 10 3 No effort is made to actually
define the standard of care; the physician is simply compared
against that standard of care in the community. 10 4 To con-
sider whether the fault system would have a greater effect
than the no-fault system, the authors were limited to a con-
sideration of the no-fault automobile insurance system in the
Province of Quebec. 10 5 It was a full tort-replacement scheme,
in which no-fault was applied regardless of the severity of in-
jury (by contrast, most American jurisdictions that have no-
fault allow suit if the injury is serious or disabling). 10 6 Amaz-
ingly, research on the preventive effect of the Quebec pro-
gram showed that there was an appreciable increase in fatal
injuries after no-fault took effect, although no one is quite
sure why this occurred. 10
7
The physician survey was most interesting. Seven hun-
dred and thirty-nine physicians were interviewed personally
99. See id. at 111-134.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 113.
103. Id. at 113-14.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 116.
106. Id.
107. Id.
7771994]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
or by survey. 10 Doctors were asked to rate malpractice liti-
gation as an influence for maintaining or enhancing the qual-
ity of medical practice. 10 9 Doctors do systematically overesti-
mate the risk that malpractice actions will be brought
against them." 0 In the low-risk group of doctors (e.g, inter-
nists), doctors perceived their risk of being sued for malprac-
tice as four times higher than it actually was; in the medium-
risk group (e.g., general surgeons), the perception was twice
as high as the reality; and in the high-risk group (e.g., obste-
tricians), the perceived risk was 1.6 times greater than the
actual risk."' Did the doctors modify their care based upon
their anecdotal assumption of suit?
In the written survey, the doctors did not rate the threat
of malpractice litigation as a very highly motivating factor in
providing improved medical treatment. 1 2 Research journals
and seminars provided a greater incentive. 1 3 But in per-
sonal interviews, doctors revealed that the threat of malprac-
tice litigation had the most pronounced impact on their prac-
tice patterns. " 4 The doctors rated as a high factor the
positive reinforcement of professional colleagues as a signifi-
cant factor in their practice." 5 A malpractice suit, which by
its very nature tends to tarnish the reputation of the physi-
cian, had a severe, psychologically disabling affect upon the
physician." 6 The threat of malpractice litigation was indeed
a significant factor. The conclusion based upon statistical
study found that at the present claims intensity level of mal-
practice litigation, the New York State negligent injury rate
is .89% of admissions. "' The injury risk would rise to 1.2%
if there were no medical malpractice claims activity."' In ef-
fect, "the current level of litigation intensity in New York ap-
peared to be reducing the negligent injury rate in our sample
by twenty-nine percent . . .and overall medical injures by
108. Id. at 118.
109. Id. at 118-19.
110. Id. at 124.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 126.
113. Id. at 128.
114. Id. at 128-29.
115. Id. at 124.
116. Id. at 126.
117. Id. at 131.
118. Id.
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eleven percent . *...""9 Malpractice litigation does indeed
have an injury-prevention effect. The authors conclude as
follows:
[C]onsequently, if the malpractice law in New York were
repealed and all providers fully insulated against suit, the
predicted increase in medical injury rates would be even
greater than the rate stated earlier, 11% .... However ill-
suited it may be as a vehicle for delivering compensation
to people who are already injured, the litigation system
seems to protect many patients from being injured in the
first place. And since prevention before the fact is gener-
ally preferable to compensation after the fact, the appar-
ent injury prevention effect must be an important factor
in the debate about the future of the malpractice litigation
system. 120
And this, my good readers, comes from the mouths of physi-
cians. This is a book that many doctors will not like. Anecdo-
tal evidence dies hard. Finally, in chapter seven, the
Harvard team "ruminates" about the future. 12  In the utili-
zation of a no-fault system, the authors assume that the cur-
rent one billion dollars paid in malpractice premiums in New
York might better be distributed among the actual iatrogeni-
cally injured persons in New York. 122 Again, this includes
those suffering medical injury not as a result of any negli-
gence but simply as a result of an unexpected or unintended
event, as well as those suffering injury from medical negli-
gence. 123 The authors discuss plans abroad, and obviously
have a hard time balancing a no-fault system against the cur-
rent system, which they would like to see modified. The au-
thors note that:
[A]fter devoting a great deal of thought and effort to this
inquiry, our best judgment is that the threat of malprac-
tice suits does somewhat reduce the risk of patient injury.
On the basis of the point estimate discussed in chapter 6,
taken at face value, the current intensity of tort litigation
in New York appears to be reducing the aggregate injury
rate there by approximately 10 percent. 124
119. Id.
120. Id. at 133.
121. Id. at 135-152.
122. Id. at 141-42.
123. Id. at 141.
124. Id. at 144.
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The authors note that the prior California study indicated
that the tort system would pay for itself if it reduced negli-
gent injury rates by twenty percent or more. 125 The authors
note that their studies indicate that negligent injury rates
were reduced by twenty-nine percent as a result of the mal-
practice litigation in New York, and "would comfortably pass
the Danzon test."'26 The authors further state that the "in-
jury prevention estimate is in fact likely to be low because of
the assumption that areas in the state with zero litigation
rates faced zero legal liability." 127 All in all, this surprisingly
short book is direct and to the point. The study methodology
was reviewed and carefully constructed. The authors ap-
peared to have no preconceived notion as to what the result
would be, and from their choice of words, indeed appeared
surprised to find that the tort system actually worked in the
area of medical negligence. Interestingly, this reviewer's im-
pression is that the tort system worked because of physicians'
personal fear of suit than because of the fact that suit was
brought in cases of actual medical negligence. This is a book
that should be carefully reviewed by our own state legislature
before they engage in any tort reform crusade. However, to
seriously expect that our legislature will accept these facts
above anecdotal evidence, any more than our local physicians
or tort bar will, is to ask too much. Relaying the results of
this book-that a team significantly comprised of physicians
found that the tort system is effective and perhaps should be
maintained-will probably in time become nothing more than
anecdotal itself.
125. Id. at 134.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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